Why It’s Needed
When Bob Stevens awoke at 2 a.m. so disoriented he tried to dress for work, his wife knew something was terribly wrong. The couple had returned early from a vacation because Stevens felt ill, and when he awoke feverish and in a confused mental state, his wife drove him straight to the emergency room. At the hospital, he soon lost consciousness, while the medical staff went into high gear, trying to diagnose and treat his illness.

The first tentative diagnosis was classic meningitis; however, an infectious disease specialist noted that Stevens’ spinal fluid specimen contained unusual bacteria – bacteria that are not the typical cause of meningitis. In fact, the pathogens he was looking at had not been seen clinically in the United States in almost 25 years. It would take 48 hours and more tests at specialized laboratories to confirm his suspicions and make a definitive diagnosis of inhalation anthrax. Bob Stevens died October 5, 2001, apparently the first victim of anthrax spores sent through the U.S. mail.

In the ensuing weeks, additional, scattered cases of anthrax appeared. Four more people died and many more were treated. Clinical laboratories around the country geared up to look for anthrax and other potential bioterrorist weapons. But what if there had been a larger attack, perhaps involving more than one pathogen? Would American laboratories and the public health system have been up to the challenge?